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RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY
AND ITS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to describe United States tradepolicy since
World War II, and to assess the possibility for ongoing U.S.trade—policy
leadership.
U.S. trade policy has shown remarkable consistency since WorldWar II. It
has never been as purely free—trade—focussed as somecommentators suggest, but
it has not recently shifted toward isolationism asdramatically as alarmists
fear. It has almost always been best described as "open, butfair," with injury
to import competitors being the measure of "fairness." Thegeneral consistency
of U.S. trade policy over time is quite remarkable given thefrequent change of
political party in power, especially in the executive branch, but also inthe
Congress.
U.S. trade—policy leadership seems still potentiallystrong despite a
decline in U.S. hegemony. It is clearly strong in aprotectionist direction.
Any shift toward aggressive insularity justifies parallel trade—policy
aggression in the eyes of trading partners. It is arguably strong ina liberal-
izing direction as well. The U.S. seems ideally poised for aggressive trade—
policy peacemaking; perhaps multilaterally, but perhaps also bilaterally;
perhaps with its traditional industrial trading partners, but perhaps also with
Japan and newly industrializing Asian countries that play so importanta role
in U.S. trade, and that, on many matters,may be closer in spirit to U.S. economic
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The purpose of this paper is to describe United States trade policy
since World War II, and to highlight some of its implications for Japan
and her more recently industrializing neighbors in East and Southeast Asia.
As such, It is aimed at filling the void that Lawrence B. Krause (1982, p. 72)
observed in his recent essay on U.S.—Japanese competition in members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN):
In formulating and executing foreign poilcy, the United
States must recognize that its form of government is
difficult for foreigners to understand. Even close
European allies have trouble following the meaning
behind every policy swing in Washington and responding
appropriately to it. The difficulty arises in part from
U.S. policy mistakes. Also, foreigners are frequently
unable to distinguish those American policies that stem
from fundamental American interests and thus are constant
from one administration (and Congress) to the next from
those policies that are subject to reversal. Developing
countries with short institutional memories must be
forgiven if they confuse the American policies that should
not be taken too serious with those that should.
Filling this void has grown even more important as trade with East and
Southeast Asia has grown. The region supplied 40 percent of all U.S. imports
in 1982, almost doubling its 1962 share of 21 percent (United States (1984,
Figure 10)). And the region purchased 16 percent of all U.S. exports in 1982,
up from 10 percent in 1962. Without Japan, the growth is proportionally even
more dramatic: the region's share of U.S. imports more than tripled from 5 to
16 percent, and its share of U.S. exports purchased doubled from 5 to 10 per-
cent.
U.S. trade policy over this period was fairly consistently liberal.
In fact future economic historians will undoubtedly stress trade2
liberalization as the most distinctive feature of U.S. commercial policy over
the past 50 years. As Table I indicates, through a series of 30 bilateral
agreements and 8 multilateral negotiations, tariffs have been steadily cut to
only about 20 percent of their 1930 average level.1 The increased use in recent
years of nontariff measures modifies this liberalization picture somewhat, but
the trend in protection over the period has clearly been downward.
Although tariff reduction has been the dominant thrust of U.S. trade policy
since the early 1930s, there have been important shifts in the nature and
extent of U.S. support for this trade liberalization. Underlying the dif-
ferent shifts in postwar U.S. trade policy are three more basic economic and
political influences. They are: first——and most important——the emergence and
subsequent decline of the United States as a hegemonic power; second, the per-
sistence during the entire period of a politically significant group of domestic
industries (whose composition changed somewhat over time) that were opposed to
duty cuts on the import products with which they competed; and, finally, the
efforts by Congress to reduce the enhanced powers granted the President during
the economic emergency of the 1930s and the political emergency of World War II.
There are a number of important conclusions of the discussion for
industrializing developing countries. First, U.S. trade policy has shown
remarkable consistency since World War II.It has never been as purely free—
trade—focussed as some commentators suggest, but it has not recently shifted
toward isolationism as dramatically as alarmists fear. It has almost always
been best described as 'open, but fair," with injury to import competitors being
the measure of "fairness."3
Table 1
Duty Reduction Since 1934 Under the U.S. Trade Agreements Programa
Proportion
of dutiable Average Remaining
imports cut in Average duties as
subject to reduced cut in proportions of
GATT conference reductions tariffs all duties 1930 tariffsb
1. Pre—GATT,
1934—47 63.9% 44.0% 33.2% 66.8%
2. First Round,
Geneva, 1947 53.6 35.0 21.1 52.7
3.Second Round,
Annecy, 1949 5.6 35.1 1.9 51.7
4.Third Round,
Torquay, 1950—51 11.7 26.0 3.0 50.1
5.Fourth Round,
Geneva,1955—56 16.0 15.6 3.5 48.9
6.Dillon Round,
Geneva,1961—62 20.0 12.0 2.4 47.7
7. Kennedy Round,
1964—67 79.2 45.5 36.0 30.5
8.Tokyo Round,
1974—79 n.a. n.a. 29.6 21.2
aSource: Real Philippe Laverge, The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs.
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1981.
bThese percentages do not take account of the effects of structural changes in
trade or inflation on the average tariff level.4
U.S. import relief policy is perhaps of greater interest to East and
Southeast Asian nations than any other aspect of U.S. trade policy, since
it is in U.S. imports from the region that the most dramatic growth has taken
place. U.S. import relief policy also shows great consistency, although dif-
ferent vehicles for delivering it have been selected at different times from
among the escape clause, unfair trade remedies, adjustment assistance, and
orderly marketing agreements. For the first two vehicles, different mixes of
tariff and non—tariff instruments have been employed at various times also.
The choice of tariff or non—tariff instrument has importance because it
affects the complexity and predictability of U.S. trade policy, and because it
determines the division of implicit revenues between the U.S. and its export
suppliers.
The general consistency of U.S. trade policy over time is all the more
remarkable given the frequent change of political party in power, especially
in the executive branch, but also in the Congress. Party affiliation, in fact,
seems no longer to be a useful predictor of U.S. trade initiative. A more use-
ful predictor appears to be some measure of Executive versus Congressional
control. The two branches of U.S. government have, different outlooks on trade
policy due to differences In constituencies. Conflict has punctuated relations
between branches of government much more often than between political parties.
Platform attempts by parties to distinguish themselves from each other on trade
policy turn out more often than not to be sheer posturing.
U.S. trade policy leadership is still potentially strong despite the decline
in U.S. hegemony. It is clearly strong in a protectionist direction. Any
shift in U.S. trade policy toward aggressive insularity justifies parallel
trade—policy aggression in the eyes of its trading partners. It is5
arguably strong in a liberalizing direction as well. The U.S. seems ideally
poised for aggressive trade—policy peacemaking; perhaps multilaterally, but
perhaps also bilaterally; perhaps with its traditional industrial trading part-
ners, but perhaps also with Japan and newly industrializing Asian countries
that play so important a role in U.S. trade, and that, on many matters, may be
closer In spirit to U.S. economic philosophy than Europe, Canada, or Latin
America.
2. U.S. TRADE POLICY, 1945_19802
Gaining Domestic Support For a Liberal International Trading Regime
Well before the end of World War II the foreign policy leaders of the
Democratic party had concluded that the lack of an open world economy during
the 1930s was a major contributory cause of the war (Gardner (1980)).
They had also concluded that the United States must take the lead after the
end of hostilities in establishing an open international trading system in
order to make "the economic foundations of peace...as secure as the political
foundation" (from a March 26, 1945 statement to Congress by President
Roosevelt). Thus, even before the War had ended the Roosevelt Administration
had drafted a proposal for a multilateral trade organization. It had also
requested substantial new tariff—reducing powers from Congress.
A desire on the part of political leaders for a new international regime
is quite different from actually bringing about such a change, especially
when——as in this case——there was a lack of strong direct pressure for the
change from either the country's electorate or other governments. The6
most important reason for the success of the Democratic leadership in first
gaining and then maintaining domestic support for a liberal posture was the
hegemonic trade and payments position that the United States assumed in the
immediate postwar period.3 The United States emerged from World War II with its
economic base greatly expanded, while the economic structures of both its ene-
mies and industrial allies were in ruins. Except for Great Britain's position
at the outset of the Industrial revolution, economic dominance of this extent is
unique in the history of the industrial nations. Even as late as 1952 the U.S.
share of total exports of the ten most important industrial countries was 35
percent, whereas it had been only 26 and 28 percent in 1938 and 1928, respec-
tively (Baldwin (1958)). The 1952 U.S. export share of manufactures was also
35 percent In contrast to only 21 percent in both 1938 and 1928. There was an
export surplus in every major industrial group. These abnormally favorable
export opportunities, together with the vigorous postwar economic recovery,
vitiated protectionist pressure from industries whose underlying comparative
cost position was deteriorating, and built support for liberal trade policies on
the part of those sectors whose international competitive position was strong.
The ability of U.S. leaders to obtain domestic support for trade
liberalization was further enhanced by the emergence of the Cold War in the
late l940s. The public generally accepted the governmental view that the
Communist countries represented a serious economic and political threat to
the United States, Its allies, and the rest of the market—oriented economic
world. There was thus widespread support for the argument that the United
States should mount a vigorous program of trying to offset the Communist
threat by providing not only military aid to friendly nations but assistance
in the form of economic grants and lower U.S. tariffs.7
The fact that implementing an open international trading system did
not involve any significant new increase in the powers of the President
also was important in gaining domestic support for the regime change. Almost
all commentators had regarded as excessive the use of logrolling during enact-
ment of the Smoot—Hawley Tariff of 1930. This, coupled with the sense of crisis
created by the Depression that followed shortly thereafter, had led Congress in
1934 to give the President authority to lower (or raise) tariffs by up to 50
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authorization in order to enable the United States to take a leadership role in
international trade liberalization did not entail any basic changes in existing
Presidential powers.
There was still considerable opposition to trade liberalization in
the immediate postwar period, however. As in the 1930s a long list of
industries testified during the 1940s and l950s against giving the President
the power to cut duties on imports competing with domestically produced goods.
The products covered include textiles and apparel, coal, petroleum, watches,
bicycles, pottery and tiles, toys, cutlery, ball bearings, glass, cheese, lead
and zinc, copper, leather, and umbrellas. Pressures from these industries to
halt further tariff—cutting because of their belief that they would be
seriously injured were further strengthened by the opposition of many
Republicans to liberalization on doctrinaire grounds. Republican advocacy of
protection on the grounds that this policy promoted domestic economic develop—
nient had an even longer tradition than the Democratic position in favor of
liberalization, based on the belief that lowtariffsreduced monopoly profits
and the prices of popular consumer goods.8
From the outset of the trade agreements program, the Roosevelt
Administration assured Congress that no duty cuts would be made that
seriously injured any domestic industry. However, in 1945 the Administration
recognized the possibility that such injury might occur by agreeing to include
in all future trade agreements an escape clause permitting the modification or
withdrawal of tariff reductions if increased imports resulting from a con-
cession caused or threatened to cause serious injury to an industry.
Furthermore, under prodding from Republican members of Congress, President
Truman in 1947 issued an executive order establishing formal procedures for
escape clause actions whereby the International Trade Commission (ITC) would
advise the President whether such a modification waswarranted.4
These developments indicate that the U.S. trade—policy commitment at
the beginning of the postwar period was to a policy of liberal trade rather
than to a policy of free trade. It was recognized at the outset that protec-
tion to particular industries would be permitted if these sectors would other-
wise be seriously injured by increased imports.
The failure of the U.S. Congress to ratify the International Trade
Organization (ITO) proposed in the Havana Conference of 1947—48, or even
to approve to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (the commercial
policy provisions of the ITO) as an executive agreement, is another indication
of the early concerns of domestic political interests for import—sensitive
U.S. industries (Diebold (1952)). Among other concerns, Congress was fearful
that establishing a strong international organization to deal with trade
matters would lead to the destruction of many U.S. industries as a result of
increased imports. Numerous members of Congress and some of the groups they
represented were also concerned about the increase in Presidential power that9
the approval of such an organization might involve. They believed that the
division of political powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial
Oranches of government had shifted excessively In favor of the executive
branch as a result of the unusual problems created by the Depression and World
War II and were, consequently, reluctant to extend new authority to the
President, especially in an area specifically reserved for Congress under the
Constitution.
Gaining International Support for a Liberal International Trading Regime
The implementation of the change from an inward—looking to an open inter-
national trading regime required the support of other countries as well as of
the U.S. electorate. The hegemonic model is the major explanation put forth
by political scientists to account for this support. The reasoning behind
this model is as follows.
An open international trading (and payments) system has elements of a
public good. For example, adopting a mercantilistic viewpoint, if one country
reduces its tariffs under the most—favored—nation principle, other countries
benefit from the improved export opportunities this action creates even if
they do not make reciprocal duty cuts themselves. Consequently, there is an
incentive for any individual country to "free—ride" by hoping that others will
reduce their own trade barriers. The net result may often be failure to
secure a balanced, multilateral set of duty reductions even though they would
benefit all participants. But as Olson (1965) and other writers on collective
goods have pointed out, it is less likely that the public good will be
underproduced if one member of the concerned group is very large compared to the
others. The dominant member is so large that the cost to it of free10
rides by other members is small compared to its own gain. Furthermore, the
large member may be able to use its power to force smaller members to practice
reciprocity. Proponents of the hegemonic theory of regime—change point to the
dominant trading position of Great Britain in the nineteenth century to
account for the creation of an open world trading regime then.
In parallel fashion, in the immediate postwar period the United States was
willing and able to bear most of the costs of establishing a liberal inter-
national economic order (Vernon (1983, pp. 8—10)). The other major industrial
countries were plagued by balance—of—payments problems and rationed their meager
suppliers of dollars in order to maximize their reconstruction efforts. The
tariff concessions they made in the early multilateral negotiations were not
very meaningful in terms of increasing U.S. exports. U.S. negotiators were
fully aware of this point. They nevertheless offered greater tariff concessions
than they received even on the basis of the usual measures of reciprocity (Meyer
(1978, p. 138)). In effect what the United States did was to redistribute to
other countries part of the economic surplus reaped from its unusually favorable
export opportunities in order to enable those countries to support the
establishment of an open trading regime.
Shifts in Domestic Support for Liberalization
When the Republicans gained both the Presidency and control of Congress
in 1952, some commentators expected a return to traditional protectionist
policies. However, President Eisenhower and his main advisors believed that
trade liberalization was an important foreign policy instrument, and
Republican business leaders——especially those in the large corporations——also
concluded that a liberal trading order was desirable from their own economic11
viewpoint. Thus, after a standoff period in 1953 and 1954 during which
protectionist Republicans in the House blocked any further tariff—cutting, the
liberalization trend was renewed. In 1955, with the help of a Democratic
Congress, President Eisenhower succeeded in obtaining a further 15 percent duty—
cutting authority. In 1958 he was granted an additional 20 percent duty—cutting
authority.
Just as more and more Republicans came to accept the desirability of a
lIberal trade polIcy as a general princIple, more and more Democrats began to
press for special exceptions to this principle. In the late 1940s, the
industries requesting import protection tended to be economically and politi-
cally small. By the mid—1950s, the politically powerful cotton textile, coal,
and domestic petroleum Industries, whose employees tended to vote Democratic,
were asking for protection. In 1955 the Eisenhower Administration, as part of
its efforts to obtain the support of the Democrats for its liberalization
efforts, pressured the Japanese into voluntarily restricting their exports of
cotton textiles to the United States. In 1962 President Kennedy agreed to
negotiate an international agreement permitting quantitative import restric-
tions on cotton textiles as part of his efforts to gain the support of
Southern Democrats from textile areas for the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
The coal and oil industries succeeded in obtaining a national security clause
in the 1955 trade act that permitted quantitative import restrictions If
imports of a product threatened "to impair" the national security. Voluntary
oil import quotas were introduced on these grounds in 1958 and made mandatory
in 1959.
The most significant change in the nature of support for protectionism
occurred in the late l960s when the AFL—CIO abandoned its long—held belief12
in the desirability of a liberal trade policy and supported a general quota
bill. The shift in labor's position was related to several developments. One
was the rapid rise in import penetration ratios (and thus a rapid rise in
competitive pressures) that occurred in many manufacturing sectors in the late
1960g. Another was labor's disappointment with the operation of the Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
As would be expected, this change in organized labor's position was
reflected in the trade—policy votes of Democratic members of Congress.
Several protectionist initiatives progressed quite far in Congress during this
period and created great uncertainty regarding the direction of U.S. trade
policy. It is doubtful, furthermore, that the Trade Act of 1974 would have
been approved had not the President made concessions to both organized labor
and particular industries subject to import pressure. The criteria for
obtaining adjustment assistance were made much easier to meet labor's objec-
tions, and the multilateral arrangement on textiles was extended to cover tex-
tile and apparel products manufactured from man—made material and wool as well
as cotton. In addition, the voluntary export restraints agreed upon in 1968
by Japanese and European steel producers were extended in the early 1970s.
Although the pattern of Congressional voting on trade—policy measures in
the early 1970s shows that Republicans favored and Democrats opposed
liberalization, it is probably not correct to conclude that this represents
a permanent shift in party positions. A more accurate description of what
seems to have happened is that liberalization versus protectionism is no
longer a significant party issue. The vote of individual members of Congress
on trade policy is now more influenced by economic conditions in their13
district or state and by the pressures on them from the President (if they are
both in the same party) rather than by party affiliation. Regression analysis
of the voting pattern on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of
1974 (Baldwin (1976, 1981)) indicates that party affiliation was significant in
1962 but not in 1974.
Congressional Restraints on the President
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felt that the President was too willing to reduce tariffs in import
sensitive sectors and——along with the International Trade Coinmission—--too
reluctant to raise them for import—injured industries. Furthermore, they
believed that the executive branch was not sufficiently "tough" in administer-
ing U.S. laws dealing with the fairness of international trading practices.
Consequently, Congress frequently took the occasion of the program's renewal
to introduce provisions designed to force the President and the ITC to comply
more closely with these Congressional views. Much of the pressure for these
provisions came from import—sensitive domestic industries and labor groups.
However, some of the pressure seemed to stem from a belief that Congress had
given the President too much of its constitutional responsibility "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations" and to levy import duties.
In the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress insisted on shifting the chair-
manship of the interagency committee established to recommend tariff cuts to the
President from the State Department (long regarded by Congress as being insuf-
ficiently sensitive to the import—injury problems of U.S. industry) to a new
agency, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The
requirement of the Trade Act of 1974 that an elaborate private advisory system14
be established has further restricted the degree of independence that the
President has in selecting items on which cuts are to be made and in deter-
mining the depth of these cuts. The creation and subsequent strengthening of
congressional delegations to trade negotiations under the 1962 and 1974 laws has
had the same effect. Since 1954, the President has been specifically directed
not to decrease duties on any article if he finds that doing so would threaten
to impair the national security. Furthermore, in granting the President
authority in 1974 to permit duty—free imports from developing countries,
Congress specifically excluded certain articles, e.g., watches and footwear,
from preferential tariff treatment.
Congress tried to pressure the President into accepting the affirmative
recommendations of the ITC on escape—clause cases when this provision was
first introduced into law in 1951 by requiring the President to submit an
explanatory report to Congress if these recommendations were rejected. Since
this seemed to have little effect on the President, Congress included a provi-
sion in the 1958 renewal act that enabled the President's disapproval of
any affirmative ITC finding to be overridden by a two—thirds vote of both the
House and Senate. This was eased in 1962 to a majority of the authorized mem-
bership of both houses and then in 1974 to only a majority of members present
and voting.
Congress has also included numerous provisions in post—war trade laws
to increase the proportion of affirmative import—relief decisions on the part
of the ITC. The most obvious way of trying to accomplish this has been to
change the criteria for granting increases in protection when an industry is
threatened with or is actually being seriously injured because of increased
imports. For example, the requirement that increased imports be related to15
a previously granted tariff concession was eliminated in 1974.
Less obvious ways that Congress used in trying to make the ITC more responsive
to its views included utilizing its confirmation powers to try to ensure that
Commission members were sympathetic to its views (Baldwin (1984)). In a
further effort to weaken the influence of the President over the Commission,
Congress in 1974 removed all controls of the executive branch over the
Commission's budget and eliminated the power of the President to appoint the
chairperson. This latter change was modified in 1977 but the President still
cannot appoint his two most recent appointees as chairperson.
Similar steps were taken by Congress to try to ensure stricter enforcement
of U.S. trade laws relating to unfair foreign practices. For example, for
many years many members of Congress felt that the Treasury Department was too
lax in administering U.S. antidumping and countervailing—duty legislation.
One step designed to change this was to transfer the determination of injury
(but not the determination of dumping) from the Treasury Department to the
ITC in 1954. In 1979, Congress completely removed the authority to determine
dumping and subsidization from the Treasury and gave these powers to the
Commerce Department——an agency that it believed would carry out the intent of
Congress more closely.
Perhaps the most significant reduction in the President's authority
over trade policy concerns.his ability to negotiate agreements with other
countries covering nontariff measures. When Congress directed the President
to seek such agreements under the Trade Act of 1974, it stipulated that any
agreements must be approved by a majority vote in both the House and
Senate——unlike tariff agreements. This provision was extended in the Trade16
Agreements Act of 1979. It gives Congress much greater control over the
nature of any agreement, and increases its control over the pattern of tariff
cuts undertaken by the President in a multilateral trade negotiation, since
tariff and non—tariff concessions made by participants are closely linked.
These constraints notwithstanding, Congress fully supported the efforts of the
President to negotiate new non—tariff codes in the Tokyo Round, and the set of
codes eventually agreed upon were approved without difficulty by the Congress.
Non—tariff Instruments of U.S. Trade Policy
Efforts increased during the 1970's to negotiate agreements that would
mitigate the adverse effects of foreign non—tariff barriers (NTBs). U.S. produ-
cers were pressuring government officials for the stricter enforcement of
existing U.S. "fair trade" legislation such as the antidumping and counter-
vailing laws, and were seeking import protection under these laws to a greater
extent than in the past.6Furthermore, domestic industries were demanding the
greater use of quantitative restrictions (as compared to higher import duties)
in protecting against injurious import increases.
One factor accounting for the greater number of less—than—fair—value cases
has been the difficulty of obtaining protection by the traditional provisions
pertaining to injury caused by import competition. Despite the 1974 easing of
the criteria for determining whether import relief should be granted, only
38 cases were decided by the ITC between 1975 and 1979 and in all but 19 of
these a negative decision was reached. Furthermore, the President rejected
import protection in all but 7 of the 19 cases. The likelihood that the
routine acceptance of affirmative ITC decisions would be interpreted by
foreign governments as an abandonment of U.S. international economic leadership17
appears to have made the President willing to accept only a few of these deci-
sions. Even the Congress has been hesitant on similar grounds to weaken the
import—relief criteria much beyond what they had been in the 1950s.
Providing protection to offset alleged unfair trade practices is much
less likely to be interpreted as representing a basic shift in policy either
by other governments or by domestic interests supporting a liberal trading
order. Thus, within reasonable bounds a President can support efforts to
achieve f air trade" through measures that protect domestic products while
still being regarded as a proponent of liberal trade policies.
A better understanding of this point has given domestic industries an
incentive to utilize U.S. fair trade legislation more extensively in seeking
import protection. The incentive has been further increased by legislative
and administrative changes in this area. Congress, though diluting the
President's power to reduce trade barriers and to set aside ITC decisions, has
at the same time given him new authority to limit imports on fairness grounds.
The 1922 and 1930 tariff acts granted the president the authority to impose new
or additional duties on imports (or even to exclude imports) from countries that
impose unreasonable regulations on U.S. products or discriminate against U.S.
commerce. The 1962 trade act further directed the President to take all
appropriate and feasible steps to eliminate "unjustifiable" foreign import
restrictions, and to suspend or withdraw previously granted concessions where
other countries maintain trade restrictions that "substantially burden" U.S.
commerce or engage in discriminating acts. The Trade Act of 1974 restates these
provisions and also gives the president the authority to take similar actions in
response to18
"subsidies (or other incentives having the effect of
subsidies) on its [a foreign country's] exports ...to
the United States or to other foreign markets which have
the effect of substantially reducing sales of the
competitive United States product or products in the
United States or in foreign markets"
and
"unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions on access to
supplies of food, raw materials, or manufactured or semi—
manufactured products which burden or restrict United
States commerce".
In amending this provision, the 1979 trade act stressed the President's
responsibility for enforcing U.S. rights under any trade agreement and
simplified the list of foreign practices against which he is directed totake
action.
Another legislative change that encouraged the use of fair trade
legislation to gain protection was the extension of the definition of
dumping in the Trade Act of 1974. Dumping was declared to encompass not
only sales abroad at lower prices than charged at home but also salesof
substantial quantities below cost over an extended period (even if domestic
and foreign prices are the same). In 1977 the steel industry filed dumping
charges covering nearly $1 billion of steel imports from Japan,all the major
industrial countries, and India under this provision. As Finger et al. (1982)
point out, fair trade cases of this magnitude in such a key sector attract so
much political opposition (both domestic and foreign) that they cannot be
disposed of at the technical level, and consequently spill over intothe politi-
cal arena. In this instance, the steel industry was successful in convincing
President Carter that their claims were justified, and the so—called trigger—
price system was worked out as an alternative to pursuingthe anti—dumping19
charges to the final stage.
A similarly political solution was reached in 1982 when the steel industry
filed charges that European steel producers were receiving extensive sub-
sidies, and therefore should be subject to countervailing duties. The
possibility of countervailing duties had such significant economic and politi-
cal implications that the governments of the parties involved did not wish the
matter to be settled on technical grounds and sought a solution at the politi-
cal level. Eventually the Europeans agreed to voluntary export restraints on
a wide range of steel products to the United States.
Other important U.S. sectors have been protected in recent years by
nontariff barriers. They include the footwear, television, and auto industries.
Voluntary export restraints were negotiated by the President in the first two
cases after affirmative injury findings by the ITC. Although the ITC rejected
the auto industry's petition for import relief, the industry was nevertheless
successful in persuading the Administration of the need for impott controls,
and the Japanese eventually agreed to restrict their sales to the United
States.
The increased use of nontariff trade—distorting measures has weakened the
liberal thrust of U.S. trade policy. This is true not only because NTBs
represent a move toward protectionism but because most of them have been
applied in a discriminatory manner and are negotiated outside of the CATT fra-
mework. Some of the political decisions reached at the Presidential level
have also occurred without the opportunity for all interested parties to be
heard, as would be the case if a technical route such as an import—injury
petition before the ITC was being followed, or even if a political route at
the Congressional level was being pursued.20
3. U.S. TRADE POLICY UNDER THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION7
President Reagan took office with an unusually well—defined set of
domestic and international policy objectives, and his vigorous efforts to
implement them have significantly affected certain aspects of U.S. trade
policy over the last three years. As often happens, however, conflicts and
unexpected interactions among policy goals, difficult—to—resist domestic and
international political pressures, and unforeseen events have combined to pro-
duce actual trade policies that only imperfectly reflect the administration's
initial objectives. On an overall assessment, trade policy under the Reagan
administration has been perhaps only somewhat more liberal than that of previous
Republican and Democratic administrations.
The Administration's Trade Policy Objectives and Their Relation to Its
Other Goals
Although all post—World War II presidents have supported the market
system, none has been as firminhis belief in its economic efficacy as
President Reagan. The administration's stance on trade issues was officially
set forth by the United States Trade Representative, William Brock, before the
Senate Finance Committee in July 1981. In this "Statement on U.S. Trade
Policy Ambassador Brock maintained that liberal trade is essential to the pur-
suit of the goal of a strong U.S. economy. At the same time, however, he empha-
sized that the Reagan administration would strictly enforce U.S. laws and
international agreements relating to such unfair practices as foreign dumping
and government subsidization.21
An important implication of the market approach is that when other nations
"have a natural competitive advantage, U.S. industry must either find away of
upgrading its own capabilities or shift its resources to other activities".
Primary reliance was to be placed on market forces rather than on adjustment
assistance or safeguard measures to facilitate adjustment in affected
industries. With respect to export—credit subsidies, the objective was "to
substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the subsidy element, and to conform cre-
dit rates to market rates". Along with cutting back on measures that artif i—
cially stimulate exports, the administration pledged to reduce or eliminate laws
and regulations that needlessly retard exports. Three types of policies with
export—disincentive effects were singled out: the taxation of Americans
employed abroad, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,andexport regulations and
controls.
Several negotiating initiatives were outlined in the paper. Most signifi-
cant were those aimed at reducing government barriers and subsidies to services
that are internationally traded, and at negotiating new international rules
dealing with trade—related investment issues (export performance and local
content requirements) and government interventions that affect trade in high
technology products.
With regard to developing countries, the stated goal was to ensure that
the more advanced developing countries undertake greater trade obligations and
that the benefits of differential trade treatment go increasingly to the
poorer members of this group. Efforts to encourage greater conformity on the
part of nonmarket economies with accepted principles of the international
trading system were also promised.
The Reagan administration expected its macroeconomic policies to22
facilitate the implementation of its trade policies. The reverse was in fact
the case. The basic reason was the failure to stimulate strong real rates
of growth. Money remained tight; favorable supply—side effects of fiscal
policy were insignificant; interest rates rose, then fell much more sluggishly
than expected; and the dollar appreciated to near—record levels. The failure
of interest rates to fall as much as expected is usually attributed to very
high current and prospective government deficits related to high levels of
defense spending, an inability to control spending on social programs, and the
relatively lower tax revenues associated with the cut in tax rates. Interest—
rate developments put upward pressure on the dollar as did, apparently, poli-
tical and economic uncertainties in many countries, which increased the
dollar's attractiveness for safekeeping purposes.
The real appreciation of the dollar has had a significantly adverse effect
on both U.S. export and import—competing industries. Exporters have found It
increasingly difficult to compete abroad with foreign producers, and import—
sensitive sectors have had to contend with both the sales—depressing effects
of the recession and increased import pressures as U.S. purchasers shift to
cheaper foreign products. The U.S. trade deficit has significantly worsened.
Export industries have also been hurt by the effects of the debt crisis in a
number of developing countries. As the recession spread abroad and the volume
of world trade declined, those countries that had borrowed abroad heavily in
the latter part of the 1970s found themselves in a situation where their
exports were falling at the same time that their debt burden had risen because
of high international interest rates. The restrictive monetary and fiscal
policies imposed on these countries by the International Monetary Fund as the23
price for agreeing to a rescheduling of their debt payments then had the effect
of curtailing their imports and further compounding the export problems of U.S.
industries.
Export—Promoting Policies
The adverse effect of the overvalued dollar and the debt crisis on
U.S. exporters appear to have been important factors in causing the Reagan
administration to modify its skeptical views on export—promoting policies.
Under considerable prodding from Congress, the administration reversed
its early intentions to reduce activities of the Export—Import Bank and to
repeal legislation allowing Domestic International Sales Corporations
(DISCs). In 1983 the administration requested Congress to increase the
loan guarantee authority of the Export—Import Bank, and also to provide the
Bank with a sizable standby fund to match the export—financing activities of
other countries. Furthermore, instead of scrapping DISCs, the executive
branch has drafted new legislation that will provide the same tax benefits for
exporters, yet be consistent with GATT rules.
The administration has delivered on most of its promises to reduce
self—imposed export disincentives. The 1981 tax act eased the U.S. tax
burden on Americans residing abroad for at least 11 out of 12 months. In the
fall of 1982 Congress passed and the President signed the Export Trading
Company Act. This important legislation permits bank holding companies and
certain types of banks to take an equity interest in export trading companies,
and also permits a partial exemption from the antitrust laws for specified
export activities that do not substantially lessen competition within the
United States.24
Another export—promoting measure proposed by the administration is the
Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act,whichmodifies certain
provisions in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Advocates of the
changes claim that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has brought about a
situation where American businessmen often do not even bother to compete
abroad for contracts, for fear that payments regarded as legal and customary in
foreign countries will be regarded as illegal under U.S. law. (Krause (1982,
pp. 82—84) discusses these effects in the context on ASEAN countries.) As one
example of the type of change being proposed, the new act stipulates that a
U.S. firm would be liable under the law only if it "directs or authorizes,
expressedly or by course of conduct" that an illegal payment be made by its
foreign agent instead of being liable, as under the 1977 act, simply because
it had "reason to know" such a payment was being made. The revised measure
also explicitly permits payments to officials of foreign governments that are
lawful under the local law and payments aimed at expediting or securing the
performance of routine official action. The Senate passed the bill in 1982
but opposition to it has developed in the House.
Import Relief Policy
Most of the Reagan administration's import relief policies have been shaped
by a complex mixture of free trade ideology, practical politics, and unan-
ticipated events. On the basis of its Statement of Trade Policy, one would have
expected the administration to follow a very tough stance against import protec-
tion. However, on the surface at least, the administration's actual performance
in granting import relief does not seem to differ significantly from the varied
record of other recent administrations.25
In 1981, for example, the administration pressured the Japanese into volun-
tarily limiting their exports of autos to the United States, even though the
International Trade Commission had earlier rejected the industry's petition for
import relief. In the same year the President reintroduced sugar quotas and
supported an extension and tightening of the Multifiber Arrangement. More
recently, he accepted the affirmative import injury determinations of the ITC in
the motorcycles and specialty steel cases. Duties were sharply raised on cer-
tain imported motorcycles and a combination of increased import duties and
quotas was used to restrict imports of specialty steel items.
In contrast, on the side of liberal trade policy actions, the Presidentper-
mitted the 1981 expiration of Orderly Marketing Agreements on nonrubber footwear
with Korea and Taiwan, despite an ITC recommendation that the Taiwanese
agreement be extended for another two years. Furthermore, he has actively
opposed "domestic content" legislation covering the automotive industry.
One policy to deal with increased competition on which there is a clear dif-
ference in performance between this and other recent administrations is trade
adjustment assistance for workers. Prompted not only by a desire to reduce
government intervention in the adjustment process but by the goal of reducing
inflationary pressures by cutting government expenditures, the administration
secured new legislation in 1981 that sharply curtailed the Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) program. It introduced more stringent qualifying require-
ments and reduced financial benefits. Legislation in 1982 again restored the
qualifying requirements of the 1974 Trade Act, but the Labor Department has
interpreted the criteria in a strict manner so that the program still remains
small. The administration has proposed a "voucher" system whereby workers
displaced for whatever reason would search for suitable education or training26
and use vouchers issued to them by the government to pay for employer on—the—
job training or for the costs of training at various schools.
It can be argued that the Reagan administration's overall import relief
record is a reasonably liberal one. In speculating about what another admi-
nistration might have done under similar circumstances, it should be stressed
that today even a strong president shares policymaking powers in the trade
field with Congress, as outlined above. Congress is much more responsive
to the immediate economic problems of various industries and groups than the
executive branch. Consider, for example, the auto case. In early 1981
Congress held hearings to publicize the plight of the industry and Senator
Danforth, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Trade of the
Senate Finance Committee, introduced a bill that would have imposed quan-
titative restrictions on Japanese auto imports. He and his colleagues pre-
ferred the President to negotiate a voluntary export restraint agreement with
Japan, but apparently were prepared to push the bill through Congress (with
little opposition expected) unless such an agreement was reached. Faced with
this prospect and the fact that he had made a campaign speech arguing for a
cutback in exports by the Japanese, the President eventually put pressure on
the Japanese government for voluntary export restraints. The President might
have held to a strong liberal trade position and threatened to veto any restric-
tive bill emerging from Congress, but it would have been politically difficult
to do so in view of his own stated position and the generally recognized fact
that increased Japanese imports were an important cause of injury in this poli-
tically powerful industry.
The failure to follow the ITC's recommendation to extend footwear quotas
against Taiwan was probably a consequence of the President's decision on autos,27
as Cohen and Neltzer (1982, p. 111) point out. The administration feared that
approval of the ITC recommendation would send an undesirable protectionist
signal to the rest of the world. Moreover, from a domestic political viewpoint
the fact that the footwear industry is much less politically powerful than the
auto, steel, or textile industries, and had already been given five years of
import protection, made it much easier to reject the recommendation.
The proposed domestic—content legislation for the auto industry presents
still a different set of circumstances for the President. This legislation is
clearly inconsistent with the trading rules of the GATT and is likely to lead to
an outpouring of protectionist charges by other countries as well as retaliation
against U.S. exports. The U.S. would jeopardize its traditional role as the
international leader of a liberal international trading order. Domestic politi-
cal support ——evenwithin the auto industry ——isalso not nearly as strong as
in the Japanese voluntary—export—restraint case, especially as auto sales pick
up in response to economic recovery. Thus, the President is able to adopt a
much stronger liberal trade position without high political costs.
Finally, the Administration's policy position during the international
negotiations in the fall of 1981 on the renewal of the Multifiber Arrangement
further illustrates the complexity of trade—policy decisions. The President had
previously expressed sympathy for the view that textile imports should only
expand at the same rate as the domestic market. He also needed the support of
members of Congress from southern textile districts to pass the budgetary
changes he proposed, and which he viewed as more important than import policy
with regard to textiles. Moreover, the European Community (EC) strongly favored
a more restrictive international agreement, and it would have been difficult to
oppose their position.28
In Pursuit of "Fair Trade"
While there is scope for disagreement concerning just how liberal the
Reagan's administration's import relief record is compared with that of other
administrations, there seems little doubt that the current administration
has pursued the goal of "fair trade more vigorously than any previous adinin—
istration. Two efforts in this regard are especially noteworthy for Asian
trade: the enforcement of existing U.S. fair trade laws, and the opening of
the Japanese market to a greater extent. (For Europe the major U.S.
initiative against unfair trade practices has been the attempt to reduce EC
agricultural subsidies.)
The main push for stricter enforcement of U.S. laws relating to dumping,
subsidization, patent infringements, and unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discri-
minatory foreign trade actions has come from Congress over the last several
years, as outlined above. It was due to Congressional initiative that the
enforcement of the fair trade laws was transferred in 1979 from the Treasury
Department to the Commerce Department. However, the Reagan administration has
had ample incentive for its own initiative on this front.
The initiation by the Commerce Department of a countervailing duty investi-
gation into certain steel exports by six European countries is a good example of
the administration's aggressive stance toward unfair trade practices. The case
was significant for the large volume of trade involved, for the fact that it was
the first time that the government had initiated such an investigation, and for
the careful manner in which the Commerce Department tried to measure the sub—
s idies.
The case was settled, hever, not by imposing countervailing duties equal
to the subsidies, as provided by the law, but by an agreement with the29
subsidizing European Community countries. The agreement quantitatively limited
the majority of EC steel mill exports to the United States for a 3—year
period. It is surprising that an administration committed to "free but fair"
trade settled its major fair trade case with an arrangement that was not care-
fully designed to just offset the alleged subsidies and is regarded as the
worst form of protection by liberal traders.
There has also been a greater use of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
which deals with unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory trade prac-
tices by foreign countries. Prior to 1981, only 3 presidential determinations
supporting the petitioners had been made, whereas in 1981 and 1982 there were
5 such determinations.Furthermore, at the urging of Congress the Reagan
administration has agreed to a strengthening of section 301's provisions.
Specifically, the administration supports an amendment that would explicitly
extend the president's authority to retaliate against unfair practices
affecting trade in services and foreign directinvestment.8
A case brought by Houdaille Industries in May 1982 under section 103 of the
Revenue Act of 1971 further illustrates the increased concern with unfair trade
practices. This law permits the President to deny investment tax credit on
imported goods if the exporting country "engages in discriminatory or other acts
(including tolerance of international cartels) or policies unjustifiably
restricting United States commerce." Houdaille requested indefinite suspension
of the investment tax credit on certain numerically controlled machines imported
from Japan, on the grounds that the Japanese government had for many years
fostered and encouraged a cartel among its domestic machine tool manufacturers,
which had given them an unfair advantage. Although the Senate passed a30
resolution urging prompt retaliation, after a 10—month investigation the admin-
istration denied the request. However, at the same time, it announced that
the U.S. and Japanese governments would hold talks on the issue and that there
may be future action on the matter.
A second area where administration officials have vigorously pushed the
notion of fairness relates to U.S.—Japanese trade more generally. There is no
other trade topic that generates more heated discussion in Congress and within
the administration than the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. This deficit
increased from $7 billion to $18 billion between 1979 and 1982. It has become
standard doctrine in parts of the government to attribute much of the deficit to
unfair trading practices on the part of the Japanese. On the export side these
allegedly take the form of industrial targeting ——apractice whereby the
Japanese government selects certain product lines for export emphasis and then
facilitates their development by coordinating research, by helping firms secure
low—cost finance, by encouraging specialization among potential competitors, by
providing marketing assistance, etc. On the import side, it is claimed that the
unfair use of such nontariff measures as standards certification procedures,
customs procedures, preferential government purchasing policies, and discrimina-
tory distribution arrangements exclude a significant volume of U.S. goods from
the Japanese market. (The average level of industrial tariffs in Japan is only
about 3 percent, a figure lower than that for the U.S. or the EC.)
Since the fall of 1981 top administration officials including the President
himself have pressed the Japanese to remove these unfair barriers, as well as to
enlarge agricultural quotas and reduce tariff rates still further. Some success
has been achieved along these lines but there is still widespread dissatisfaction
with Japan's response. The reciprocity bill insisted upon by Congress is31
largely a manifestation of this dissatisfaction. Recently, trade officials
have begun to focus more closely on the industrial targeting practices of
Japan. It is quite possible that the U.S. will take some form of trade policy
actions to offset the effects of these practices.
The soundness of the case against Japan is difficult to determine. On the
one hand, U.S. firms have documented numerous instances of practices that seem to
restrict U.S. exports to Japan unfairly. More and more is also becoming known
about the export—promoting policies of the Japanese government. On the other
hand, an increase in the trade deficit for this reason would have required an
increase in unfair practices, and there seems little evidence of increased
unfairness. Writers such as Saxonhouse (1982) and even the President's own
Council of Economic Advisors (United States (1983)) have further argued that
Japan's trade pattern (a significant trade surplus for manufactured goods, more
than balanced by a significant trade deficit for primary products) is con-
sistent with the country's human and physical resource endowments. While
the Council of Economic Advisors believes that major trade liberalization by
Japan would do much to relieve the political strains between the two
countries, they state that "Japanese trade policy does not play a central role
in causing the bilateral imbalance with the United States" (p. 56).
4. THE KEY QUESTtON:
HOW MUCH OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S.
TRADE POLICY LEADERSHIP?9
The General Issue
U.S. trade policy since World War II has enjoyed unique liberties and
been subject to unique limitations. It has enjoyed the early postwar liberty32
of serving international and national security goals without unduly serious
domestic consequences. Those goals remain, with universal expectations that the
U.S. will design trade policy at least in part to attain them. The expectations
have, however, recently become a unique limitation on U.S. trade policy, which
is increasingly subject to familiar domestic political pressures.
U.S. trade policy has always served two masters, a domestic and a foreign
constituency. U.S. leadership has become more difficult in recent years as
the relative strength of the domestic constituency has grown. Some have
described this as the "domestication" of U.S. trade policy. "Domestication
causes tensions especially for a U.S. President, whose trade initiatives must
somehow continue to serve both masters. Congress has become, by contrast,
much more narrowly focussed. Ahearn and Reifman (1983) comment on "its con-
tinuing disinclination to sacrifice U.S. commercial interests for foreign—
policy objectives."
Because of both domestic and foreign constituencies, no modern U.S. presi-
dent feels able to promote openly a general policy of import protection. The
United States is still viewed by the other major industrial nations as the
leader of the liberal international trading order. These countries still
basically support this regime and believe that if the United States adopts
general protectionism, it will rapidly spread throughout the trading world
along with beggar—thy—neighbor exchange—rate policies. It is a widely
accepted view that the result of this collapse of the existing trade and
financial order would be extensive job losses in export sectors and massive
financial losses in industries with export and foreign direct investment
interests. Because of the great political and economic power of these
sectors, together with the considerable pressures foreign constituencies can33
bring to bear, a president would run significant political risks if he openly
pursued a policy of general protectionism.
At the same time, it is also very difficult politically for a president to
resist granting protection to specific industries that are politically signi-
ficant in voting and/or financial terms, and that also seem to have a good
case in U.S. and international import—relief or fair—trade laws. If, for
example, the ITC had rendered an affirmative decision in the recent auto case
and President Reagan had rejected this decision, it seems likely that Congress
would have vetoed his action, as it could have at that time with a simple
majority vote. Moreover, Congress probably would have blocked other legislation
desired by the President in retaliation for his decision. Even without the
congressional veto a president runs this risk when he takes actions against a
strongly held congressional view. It is not politically rational to turn down
"good" cases for protection ——unlessa president regards resistance to import
relief for a politically powerful industry considered to be deserving of such
relief by many members of Congress to dominate his other political goals.
Difficulties and trade—policy tensions are, of course, predictable results
of growing U.S. dependence on international markets, and of decline in U.S.
influence in them. Growing U.S. trade dependence increases the effect of the
country's trade policy on domestic economic variables. Responsiveness
(elasticity) of sectoral output, employment, and profit with respect to trade
policy rises as import and export shares rise. When trade shares were small,
even export and import embargoes had only modest impacts on domestic
industries. As trade shares have grown, so has the attractiveness of trade
policy to attain domestic goals, and to defend against "unfair" trade prac-
tices of foreign firms that are no longer just token competitors for U.S.34
giants.
In contrast, as the rest of the world has grown relative to the US. since
World War II, its trade dependence on the U.S. has declined. Responsiveness
(elasticity) of global output, employment, and profit with respect to U.S.
trade policy has become smaller. U.S. ability to influence world economic
prosperity has therefore declined, and so has the claim of this goal to
priority in shaping U.S. trade policy. The important, but non—voting, foreign
constituents of U.S. trade policy have taken careful note of its reduced
Influence on them at the same time as voting U.S. constituents have awakened
to its growing influence on them.
U.S. Leadership Internationally: Hegemony, Oligarchy, Anarchy(?)
If the tensions and trends described above are identified with the decline
of U.S. hegemony, the natural question is whether they undermine the inter-
national leadership of the U.S. in establishing liberal trade policy. Several
answers are possible.
The hegemonic model of regime change not only predicts openness in world
trading arrangements when a hegemonic state is in its ascendency but a shift
toward a closed system if this nation declines in power and is not replaced
by another dominant state. Although this model is consistent with the early
part of the postwar period, there is general agreement (Krasner (1976),
Goldstein (1981), Lipson (1982)) that the model does not perform very well as an
explanation of regime change for more recent years.
Despite a shift in power from a situation where one country dominated the
economic scene to one where there are now three major economic blocs (the
United States, the European Community, and Japan), most observers agree that35
the trade and payments regime continues to be essentially anopen and liberal
one. As Table 1 in the introductory section shows, the tariff Cuts made in
the 1960s and 1970s were actually much deeper than those made in the 1940s and
1950s. Furthermore, the new nontariff codes negotiated during theTokyo
Round, though often very general in their wording, do represent a significant
accomplishment. The GATT Ministerial meeting in November 1982 and the
leadership role that the United States played in establishing the agenda are
additional indications of the continued commitment of the major industrial
nations to a liberal international economic order.
A consideration of the economic theory of either market behavioror of the
production of collective goods suggests why the hegemonic model fails to predict
the continuation of an open system. A single firm that dominates a market is
likely to stabilize its price at a monopolistic level while still tolerating
some price cutting by the smaller firms making up the rest of the industry.
However, oligopolistic market theory suggests that the same result is possible
if two or three large firms dominate an industry. Similarly, as Olson (1965)
pointed out, the free—rider problem associated with collective action by an
industry can be overcome if a small number of firms (as well as just one firm)
produce a significant share of the industry's output. Bargaining and enfor-
cement costs may then be sufficiently low that property rights to collective
goods can be established along with fees and penalties for cheating. Thus, the
continued support for a stable, open trading order as the distribution ofpower
changed from an almost monopolistic situation to an oligopolistic one is quite
consistent with market—behavior theory.
The shift from a hegemonic position to one in which the country shares its
previous economic and political power with a small number of other nations is,36
however, likely to alter the country's own international behavior somewhat, just
as the change in the status of a firm from a monopolist to an oligopolist is
likely to change the firm's market behavior. In the U.S., the nature of the
change has been to initiate trade negotiations mainly to achieve domestic econo-
mic benefits rather than to further international political and national
security goals.
As might be expected, the less altruistic behavior on the part of the
United States has resulted in an increased number of trade disputes. Many who
support a liberal trading order are concerned that these disputes will become so
numerous and difficult that the system will collapse, with each of the major
trading powers pursuing inward—looking trade policies. This is of course a
possibility, and is discussed further below. It is significant, however, that
most of the trading frictions do not arise because of disagreements on the prin-
ciples of an open trading system, but on matters of interpretation within
these principles. For example, the key parties in the system have always agreed
that it was proper to shield an industry from injurious increases in imports.
Consequently, when the United States protects the auto and steel industries from
import competition, or when the Europeans subsidize industries as a means of
retaining their domestic market shares, this is not regarded by most countries
as a departure from the basic liberal trading rules. Disagreements sometimes
arise, however, over whether a country is going beyond the intent of the rules
and engaging in what are in effect beggar—thy—neighbor policies. The settlement
of major disputes at a high political level and the continuing efforts to
improve the GATT dispute—settlement mechanism are a recognition by the major
trading nations of the damage to the system that could occur from such
disagreements.37
Krasner (1976) argues in his amendment to the hegemonic model that the
abandonment of commitment to a liberal trading order is likely to occur only
when some major external crisis forces leaders to pursue a dramatic new policy
initiative. It may be that the existing power—sharing arrangement between the
United States, the European Community, and Japan reduces the likelihood of
this outcome compared to the case of a declining hegemony in the midst of many
smaller states. In this latter situation the dominant power is tempted in a
crisis to take advantage of its monopoly power over the terms of trade. When
power is shared, however, the recognition that a country's market power is
quite limited and that retailiation is likely to be swift and significant
tends to discourage such adventurism.
It is worth considering less sanguine outlooks, however, since major cri-
ses may occur, and since developing countries in particular may not enjoy
the benefits of the countervailing trade policy power described above. A
familiar American image may help to flesh out what could happen if some
crisis prompted U.S. trade policy to become openly aggressive and national-
istic. "Frontier justice" might increasingly order trade and policy.
Under frontier justice, if any government could "get away with it," it would
"do it" Strong governments would survive prosperously; weak governments,
tenuously. The economic problem with frontier justice is unpredictability.
More organized systems of justice regularize economic exchange, establishing
boundaries for what qualify as voluntary transactions, rules governing the
exploitation of market advantage, and sanctions to guarantee the enforcement
of contracts. Frontier justice, by contrast, could destabilize economic
exchange, becoming an irritant to the market rather than its lubricant.
U.S. hegemony, undesirable though it was in some ways, clearly checked38
the scope for policy aggression, much as the frontier sheriff or U.S. marshall
checked the scope for frontier justice. The awkward question that a crisis
might raise is what happens on the frontier when the sheriff not only grows
weaker, but begins to act aggressively, "just like everyone else"?
Aggressive trade policies are to be feared more for their potential to
disorder resource allocation than to mis—order it. The law of the jungle
is as haphazard a way of ordering policy transactions as it is of ordering
market transactions. Even laisser—faire economists have in mind some par-
ticular legal structure of common—law conventions when they favor "free"
markets and liberal trade policy. The threat is that a crisis might cause
longstanding legal structures and conventions governing government behavior to
be abandoned. Uncertainty at best and chaos at worst could be the consequence
for international trade and investment. The danger of the worst case can be
appreciated by considering what happens to everyday commerce during civil
disorder, when legal systems crumble and vigilantism waxes strong.
U.S. leadership in trade policy to minimize the chance of this worst—case
scenario is still probably quite strong. The U.S. would seem the logical ini-
tiator in what Blackhurst (1981, p. 369 passim) has described as a return
toward "conventions" in trade policy. Blackhurst has in mind conventions that
would at least order, but not bind, trade policy. Governments themselves should
be the constituents. Mutually agreed conventions protect governments from each
other, and also from domestic political constituents in narrow pursuit of trade
policies that serve their special interest at the expense of other constituents.
There are three important practical challenges in any such return toward
conventions. One is to avoid over—ambitious promulgation of "rules" which,
when broken, breed the unpredictability that disorders resource allocation.39
A second is to keep the resource and time costs of negotiation in check so as to
increase chances for a cooperative outcome. A third is to incorporate deve-
loping countries better into "convention—setting" than they have been recently.
In these lights it is worth evaluating the multilateral negotiating approach
very carefully. In view of significant differences among countries concerning
trade policies, multilateral negotiations may now be too cumbersome and costly
in terms of what can be achieved. Negotiations among a small number of
countries on selected issues of particular concern to the group may be morepro-
ductive. This would represent a return to the negotiating technique followed so
successfully in the 1930s under the Trade Agreement Act of 1934. The group is
small enough and sufficiently concerned for the negotiations to be efficient,
yet the collective benefits reaped from the most—favored—nation principle need
not be sacrificed.
What this may suggest practically for the U.S. is aggressive bilateral
peacemaking ——theformation of mutually advantageous coalitions with like—
minded governments)° For example, the U.S. and Japan seem likely partners for
a bilateral trade agreement that would order trade along lines that are held
closely in common.
U.S. Leadership Domestically: Potential for the Reagan Administration
A President's ability to reconcile the trade—policy conflicts between
domestic and foreign constituencies depends on many factors ——hispolitical
strength among voters, his economic and political goals, his effectiveness
in dealing with Congress and the public, the extent to which his own party
controls Congress, etc. President Reagan thus far has not exhibited special
interest in international economic matters. Ills policy decisions in this
field have been mainly reactive. While he has been guided in these responses40
by a strong preference for the market mechanism, he has also shown a willingness
to compromise in the face of strong domestic or international political opposi-
tion to a clear—cut market solution.
A president can make a significant difference domestically in the nature of
trade policy. This is most likely to occur when he initiates major trade—policy
actions himself, as well as responding to well—taken pressures. In this way he
is often able to transcend the narrow, short—run concerns that dominate most
political decisionmaking, and gain support among legislators and the public
based on their concerns for the long-run economic and political welfare of the
country. An initiative in this spirit has been President Reagan's recent propo-
sal to create a cabinet—level Department of International Trade and Industry.
Yet in many ways this initiative may be premature. Clarifying initiatives
toward U.S. trade strategy and policy instruments seem needful beforehand, along
with credible actions to underwrite such initiatives. We turn to these
clarifying initiatives after a brief discussion of the proposal for a new
department.
The proposed Department of International Trade and Industry would be
created by merging the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
which is in the Executive Office of the President, and parts of the Commerce
Department. The new department would allegedly "provide a strong, unified
voice for trade and industrial matters." There are sound arguments both for and
against such a merger. With the 1979 transfer to the Commerce Department of
responsibility for administering the basic fair trade laws, and with the greater
emphasis under the Reagan administration on enforcement of these laws, signifi-
cant parts of trade policy administration are divided between USTR and the
Commerce Department. Conflicts between the two agencies weaken international41
effectiveness in trade disputes and sometimes send conflicting signals to
domestic producers. Yet such conflicts are inevitable under the present
arrangement, and would presumably be reduced with the new agency. Bringing
together the economic staff of the Commerce Department and the trade officials
of USTR would also stimulate the kind of in—depth economic studies that are so
badly needed to prepare U.S. negotiators adequately, as well as to undertake
long—range trade policy planning.
A possible drawback of the new department is that the inter—agency aspect of
trade policy formation that has existed since the 1930s could be lost or
seriously weakened. Trade policies affect matters over which most of the major
federal departments have some control, and decisions on most issues are now
reached through Inter—agency meetings chaired by USTR and involving such agen-
cies as State, Treasury, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, Interior, ITC, and
Defense. Some individuals fear that the current process of balancing the
diverse views of representatives from these agencies would be lost and instead
be replaced by a process in which the business—oriented views of the Commerce
Department become dominant. There is also some concern that trade policy may
end up being downgraded in importance, since it will no longer be directed from
the Executive Office of the President.
The merger issue is not likely to be resolved soon, since there is signifi-
cant opposition to it in Congress. In the meantime, the debate over the new
department could be informed greatly by initiatives to clarify the strategy
and instruments of U.S. trade policy.
(1) Strategy. Recent U.S. trade initiatives, especially from Congress,
reveal an anomalous division of opinion concerning the proper trade strategy42
for the United States. Some initatives attempt to export U.S. policy tradi-
tion to the rest of the world. Others attempt to import poilcy tradition
abroad to the United States. Illustrating the first are new conceptions of
"reciprocity" ——notionsthat policy abroad must provide U.S. firms with the
same market opportunities as our policies provide to their firms,... or else!
Illustrating the second are new conceptions of trade policy as active
industrial policy ——notionsthat U.S. trade policy should be marshalled as
an important tool in striving for an optimum industrial structure.
The two strategies above are not inconsistent of course ——tradepolicy
abroad could become like "ours" at the same time as "ours" became like
others'. The result of both strategies would be policy convergence. Thus
both represent a departure from the historical U.S. approach, which is more
aptly characterized as policy tolerance ——acceptpolicy differences in
general, and at the margins exchange policy concessions for mutual gain. The
appeal of policy convergence over policy tolerance appears to rest in the
suspicion of unfairness discussed above. One might typify it as "If they only
stopped cheating on the system and played like we do, then the field would be
more level; if we only 'wised up' and played like they do, we could share all
their advantages." In this light, the traditional tolerance approach may
appear unappealing, "the same old thing again, just chipping away at the
margin." The reality may, however, be otherwise than the appearance.
Chipping away at the margin of policy differences may ultimately be more
fruitful than a full frontal attack on them. The strategy of U.S. trade
policy needs careful scrutiny.
The issue of rules versus discretion in trade policy is closely related.
U.S. tradition is rules—based and ultimately subject to litigation. Tradition43
abroad is much more discretionary ——flexible,managerial, and administrative.
Negotiation rather than litigation is the vehicle for resolving differences.
Here there is a genuine conflict for U.S. trade policy. Movement toward an
even greater use of rules can satisfy domestic constituencies but isolate the
U.S. still further in international negotiations. A good example is changes in
countervailing—duty law and its administration, described by Shuman and Verrill
(1983). Although the rules are now clearer than ever, there is still marked
sensitivity in the executive branch to foreign objections when countervailing—
duty cases are aggressively pursued. Negotiations with industry and foreign
governments may ensue, with the result that the admittedly clear rules are by-
passed by discretionary negotiation among the participants.
Movement away from rules toward discretion may, however, aggravate the
widespread sense that the U.S. government isn't actively pursuing American
interests, and undermine domestic support for all U.S. trade policy. It is
curious in light of this to see the strength of U.S. support for active trade
policy as industrial policy. Such active policy would almost surely necessitate
fewer rules—centered policy decisions and more discretionary, technocratic, and
unpredictable policy directives.
Finally, U.S. initiative is much needed on the adjustment issue of
how to respond to sectoral policy abroad. Such policy in due time encourages
U.S. sectoral adjustment in an opposite direction, with attendant adjustment
costs. Should U.S. trade policy attempt to attenuate the adjustment, acce-
lerate It, or remain passive? And what if the policy abroad appeared likely
to fail? Should U.S. trade policy attempt to avoid the doubling of adjustment
costs as industrial resources move to and fro? Should active adjustment—
centered trade policy be bilateral or most—favored—nation?44
(2) Instruments. It may be timely for the United States to initiate the
restoration of tariffs and other taxes as the chief instruments of trade policy.
The increased significance of administrative non—tax policy for exports and
imports is well—known. Yet some of the unfortunate by—products of this are not
widely appreciated.
One result of the greater use of administrative policies is intricacy. It
becomes harder to identify foreign policies, much less their effects. It also
becomes harder to implement one's own trade objectives. Intricacy raises the
resource cost of estimating and monitoring trade policy, no matter who initiates
it. Intricacy also slows down trade policymaking. Administrative trade policy,
unlike tariffs, invades the turfs of regulatory agencies, congressional over-
sight committees, and sometimes even the judiciary.
Intricacy increases allegations of unfairness and discrimination. This is
because administrative trade policy is inherently opaque compared to tariffs or
explicit export subsidies. Opaqueness tends to heighten suspiclous that
something discriminatory and unfair is going on below surface appearances.
Opaqueness leads naturally to the increased pursuit of unfair trade cases.
Furthermore, opaqueness invites Congress to respond to perceived Inequity with
comparably opaque initiatives. Administrative trade policy has made it
increasingly difficult for the U.S. to maintain the balance in its historical
position that trade should be "free but fair."
A closely related result from greater use of administrative policies is
unpredictability. Unpredictability undermines the ability of the market system
to function, especially impeding those markets that allocate resources over time
for investment, education, and research. This in turn aggravates adjustment
problems.45
For example, in recent years many initatives in U.S. trade policy have been
non—tax rules with discretionary over—rides. Orderly marketing arrangements in
footwear and television equipment can be described in this way, as can the Tokyo
Round codes on subsidization, dumping, and government procurement.
Unpredictability is an unfortunate by—product because these initiatives unwhole-
somely mingle policing with policy responsibility. The same authorities who are
charged with predictably enforcing the rules are also charged with using
their discretion to revise them sensibly. The two responsibilities are in
conflict. Tariffs and other tax—based trade policy provide a sharp contrast.
Enforcement of the rules is the clear responsibility of the Customs Service or
the Internal Revenue Service. Discretionary revision of the rules is the
clear responsibility of the Congress with the Executive's cooperation,
featuring relatively predictable procedures for dissemination of information,
expressing opinions, etc. There is no conflict since policing and policy are
vested in different groups.
Economists who applaud the benefits of price competition but are chary of
non—price competition (advertising, etc.) might consider the trade policy ana-
log. There may be much clearer benefits to "tariff competition" ——negotiating
concessions in the traditional way, threatening tax—based retaliation, etc. ——
thanto competition among governments in administrative protection.
Deregulation in the U.S. accentuates these tendencies. The removal of
regulations, most of which are non—tax directives, forces a trade policy
question: should the regulations be removed for all agents, or only for
domestic agents? Taking the latter route implies special treatment for
foreign sellers or buyers and is by its discriminatory nature a trade policy.
But the Initiating authority may be none of the traditional trade policy46
centers. It may be rather the Department of Energy, the Federal Communications
Commission, or the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
U.S. initiative is needed to clarify jurisdiction over these questions.
Implicit revenue provides, however, a possibly important counterweight for
preferring the continuation of U.S. reliance on non—tax policies. Orderly
marketing agreements may transfer to exporting countries enough market power,
related revenues, and terms—of—trade advantage to compensate them for injury
caused by reducing shipments to the U.S. Developing country exporters of
potentially differentiable goods, such as the newly industrializing countries
of East and Southeast Asia, may have especially strong preferences for these
non—tax agreements. Even U.S. policymakers might defend them as an instrument
of international compensation for what would otherwise be a clear beggar—thy—
neighbor barrier.
U.S. Leadership: Entries on an Agenda for "Aggressive Peacemaking"
U.S. trade—policy initiative in "aggressive peacemaking" requires consensus—
building at home and abroad. Domestic and foreign constituents of U.S. trade
policy are alike in their fragmentation over the best ways of ordering inter-
national exchange. "Disequilibrium" is the word that best describes their
shifting and disparate views on trade policy.
For example, there are valid national reasons why countries may wish to
introduce industrial policies or behave strategically in competing for
international markets. However, in the absence of well—defined international
conventions concerning just what constitutes acceptable international behavior
and setting forth workable dispute settlement mechanisms, there are also
dangers with a strategic policy approach. When each country actively47
pursues this approach and retaliates against others who do so, it is possible
that all trading nations end up with lower employment and income levels than
otherwise, as the sequence of actions mayconstitutea negative sum game.
11 These potential costsneed to be described clearly to the American public
and internationally. The description needs to be rooted in current fact and
recent history. U.S. leadership seems natural in this task, given U.S. corn—
parativ'e advantage in economic education and research, and the still strong tra-
dition of independence and objectivity among U.S. analysts arid commentators.
A cooperative international approach worked quite well for many years
after World War II. However, fundamental changes in the distribution of eco-
nomic power among countries, including the growth of newly industrializing
countries, coupled with differences among countries in the extent to which
they have pursued active and reactive trade policies, have all served to lessen
the effectiveness of the rules under which the postwar trading regime has
operated. What is needed now is aggressive peacemaking aimed at establishing a
new cooperative approach.
Any new cooperative approach is likely to require bilateral or
multilateral agreements on several key elements of trade policy. One of the
most important of these concerns the types of government intervention, espe-
cially public subsidization, that should and should not be countered with of f—
setting actions by other governments. Present GATT rules and practices are
not sufficiently precise in this area. National laws on countervailing are
also too simplistic to deal with modern conditions. In particular, there is
insufficient recognition of the character of activist trade policies. By no
means are all such policies aimed at gaining at the expense of others. Some
can bring gains to all trading parties. Yet these are not sufficiently48
delineated in either GATT or national conventions. Nor are the procedures for
settling disputes in this area sufficiently effective. Nor are the advantages
and disadvantages of special treatment for developing—country subsidies care-
fully thought out.
Greater agreement among the industrial and the newly industrializing
countries concerning temporary assistance to sectors faced with severe adjust—
inent problems is also needed. Countries claiming that their subsidies are
strictly for adjustment purposes sometimes find their adjustment problems made
worse by countervailing duties imposed by others. The need for a new saf e—
guards code has also been recognized for several years. Integration of a
new safeguards code with preferential treatment, if any, for developing
countries might be the next step.
Bilateral and multilateral agreements relating to competition policy seem
necessary. When international markets are imperfect, the abnormal profits
that are available are tempting targets of government trade policies.12
However, if international understandings can be developed that dIscourage
cartel—like behavior, abuse of dominant market positions, and attempts to
monopolize, much of the incentive for such profit—shifting trade policies may be
eliminated. It is unlikely that competition policy can be dealt with adequately
without also strengthening existing agreements relating to foreign direct
investment.
Aggressive peacemaking through cooperation may also be needed in the areas
of exchange—rate, monetary, and fiscal policies. Independent actions by some
nations in these policy areas have created serious income and employment
problems in others, especially when compounded with international debt problems.
Without cooperative efforts to mitigate these problems, agreements in such areas
as subsidization may not be meaningful or effective.49
FOOTNOTES
1.If the effects of structural shifts In trade and of inflation on
specific duties are included along with the negotiated tariff cuts,
the average tariff on dutiable imports drops from a 1931 level of
53 percent to about 5 percent after completion of the Toyko Round
cuts.
2. Additional detail on matters discussed in this section can be
found in Baldwin (1982).
3. Authors of this explanation for the postwar establishment of a liberal
InternatIonal economIc order under U.S. leadershIp Include Klndleberger
(1973, 1981), Gilpin (1975, 1977) and Krasner (1976). See Lipson (1982)
for a succinct statement and analysis of the hegeinonic model.
4. See Leddy and Norwood (1963) for a detailed discussion of the escape
clause, as well as the peril point provision. The peril—point provision
directed the President to submit to the ITC a list of all articles being
considered for tariff negotiations, and required the Commission to
determine the limits to which each duty could be reduced without causing
or threatening serious injury to import—competing domestic industries.
This provision was a part of U.S. trade law from 1948 through 1962,
except for a brief repeal in 1949 and 1950.
5. For a description of the protectionist pressures from the cotton
textile as well as the oil and coal industries during the l950s and
early l96Os, see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), Chapter 25.
6. Between 1955 and 1972 the average number of antidumping reports
issued by the ITC averaged less than 6 per year. This rate
increased to 13 between 1974 and 1979. Similarly, the number of
countervailing duty investigations completed by the ITC between 1962
and 1973 was 12, while the number rose to 37 between 1974 and the end
of 1978.
7. Additional detail on matters discussed in this section can be
found in Baldwin (1983).
8. This so—called "reciprocIty' bill also requires an annual report of
foreign trade barriers and what is being done to reduce them.
Congress actually preferred a considerably stronger version of the
bill but accepted this compromise at the urging of the administration.
9. Additional detail on some matters discussed in this section can be found
in Baldwin (1982, 1983) and Richardson (1983a,b).50
10. See Aho and Bayard (1983) and Vernon (1983, pp. 40—41 passim) for more
detailed consideration of such proposals, including some that would
abandon MFN treatment. The European Community has been essentially
following this route as it expands, and in its preferential arrangements
with non—member countries. See Camps and Diebold (1983) and Greenway
(1984) for arguments in favor of renewed aggressive multilateral
negotiating strategies.
11. "Would any of you think of building a tower without first sitting down
and calculating the cost, to see whether he could afford to finish
it?... Or what king will march to battle against another king, without
first sitting down to consider whether with ten thousand men he can
face an enemy coming to meet him with twenty thousand? If he cannot,
then, long before the enemy approaches, he sends envoys, and asks for
terms."(Luke14: 28, 31—32, New English Bible).
12. See Grossman and Richardson (1984) for a summary of the literature on this
matter.51
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